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Abstract: 
Several self theories explore the effects of discrepant self-beliefs on motivation and emotion. This research 
intersected two self theories: self-discrepancy theory and objective self-awareness theory. Self-discrepancy 
theory predicts that ideal and ought discrepancies cause different negative emotions; objective self-awareness 
theory predicts that high self-awareness will strengthen the relationship between self-discrepancies and 
emotions. People (N = 112) completed measures of self-discrepancies and emotions (dejection, agitation, 
positive affect, and negative affect). Self- focused attention was manipulated with a large mirror. When self-
awareness was low, self-discrepancies had weak, nonsignificant relations to emotion. When self-awareness was 
high, however, self-discrepancies strongly predicted emotional experience. These effects were general—ideal 
and ought discrepancies affected emotions because oftheirsubstantial shared variance, not their unique variance. 
Implicationsfor theories of self- discrepancies and emotions are considered. 
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Article: 
The study of the self’s role in emotional experience has a long history in social psychology. The earliest ―self 
theories‖ explored how beliefs about the self, particularly disparities between the self and desired self-states, 
affected motivation and emotion (Aronson, 1969; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Interest in how self-beliefs relate 
to emotional experience remains strong in contemporary research (Leary, 2003; Tesser, 2000).Several modern 
self theories consider how gaps between the self and some criterion—such as a standard, goal, self-guide, or 
selfimage—affect emotions (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Higgins,1987; Ogilvie,1987).These 
theories have independently made important contributions to the study of self and emotion, but their 
intersections remain largely unexplored (see Carver, 1996; Heppen & Ogilvie, 2003). 
 
In this research, we explore some intersections between two of these theories: objective self-awareness (OSA) 
theory (Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia &Duval, 2001a) and self-discrepancy (SD) 
theory (Higgins, 1987, 1999b). Although they have much in common, these theories make some different 
predictions about the role of discrepant self-beliefs in the experience of emotions. We present an experiment 
that explores some of their diverging predictions and then consider implications for theories of SDs and emo-
tions (Carver, Lawrence, & Scheier,1999; Ogilvie,1987). By illuminating continuities between these theories, 
we hope to contribute to the integration of what Tesser (2000) has called ―the self zoo,‖ the sprawling group of 
independent self theories. 
 
THEORIES OF SDS AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
OSA theory (Duval & Wicklund,1972) was one of the first modern theories to consider how discrepancies 
affect emotions (cf. Freud, 1923). OSA theory assumes that people have representations of the self’s features as 
well as representations of standards that specify features the self ought to have. Standards for the self are 
assumed to be diverse and idiosyncratic; they are often vague, perfectionistic, unattainable, and inconsistent 
with other standards (Duval & Silvia, 2001). Duval and Wicklund (1972) asserted that evaluating the self 
requires focusing on the self. OSA—a state of attention focused on the self—initiates a self-standard 
comparison process in which people evaluate the self in relation to relevant standards. Discrepancies from 
standards generate negative affect (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000; Mor & Winquist, 2002). This motivates changing the 
self, changing the standard (Duval & Lalwani, 1999), or avoiding the situation (Moskalenko &Heine, 2003). 
Whether people constructively change the self versus defensively avoid the situation depends on expectations 
for improvement (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Silvia & Phillips, 2004) and attributions for failure (Duval & Silvia, 
2002; Silvia &Duval, 2001b). Congruity between self and standards generates positive affect, which rewards 
the action that established congruity (Duval & Silvia, 2001, 2002). 
 
OSA theory has several implications for the relationship between discrepancies and emotions. First, if people do 
not attend to self–standard discrepancies, then the discrepancy’s effects on emotion will be limited. Because 
activity is more closely aligned with standards when people are self-focused (Carver, 1975; Gibbons, 1978; 
Hormuth, 1982), the correspondence between discrepancies and emotional experience should be closer when 
people are objectively self-aware. Second, the theory has been silent about whether different types of 
discrepancies cause different types of emotions. As a ―consistency theory,‖ OSA theory assumes that inconsis-
tency between self and standards creates general negative affect (Duval & Silvia, 2001), akin to the notions of 
negative affect asserted by balance theory (Heider, 1958) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). 
 
SD theory (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985), another theory of discrepancies and emotion, 
posits three domains of the self: actual, ideal, and ought. The actual self is the person’s representation of who he 
or she is currently. The ideal self is the representation of who he or she would like to become, such as wishes 
and aspirations for the self. The ought self is the representation of who a person feels he or she should become, 
such as duties and obligations for the self. Discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves cause dejected 
emotions such as depression and sadness; discrepancies between the actual and ought selves cause agitated 
emotions such as anxiety and tension (Higgins, 1987). SDs vary in magnitude and in accessibility. Chronic and 
momentary accessibility amplify the relationship between discrepancies and emotions (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & 
Strauman, 1986). 
 
OSA theory and SD theory have some interesting similarities and differences. Each theory connects emotional 
experience to disparities between the self’s present features—the self in OSA theory, the actual self in SD 
theory—and criterion states for the self. Each theory also contains a mechanism that moderates the degree to 
which discrepancies affect emotion and activity. In OSA theory this mechanism is self-focused attention; in SD 
theory it is the accessibility (chronic or momentary) of the discrepancy. These mechanisms have much in com-
mon, given the role of attention in cognitive accessibility. The theories diverge in their notions of how standards 
relate to emotions. OSA theory views standards as enormously diverse, but it has not considered types of stan-
dards. SD theory, in contrast, categorizes standards as ideal or ought selves. Furthermore, OSA theory has had 
little to say about types of negative emotions, whereas SD theory assumes unique relationships between types of 
discrepancies and negative emotions. 
 
DISCREPANCIES AND EMOTIONS 
The most salient difference between the two theories is SD theory’s prediction regarding unique relations 
between ideal and ought selves and dejection and agitation. Indeed, SD theory is best known for this prediction. 
Researchers in diverse areas of psychology have found support for SD theory’s predictions (e.g. Boldero & 
Francis, 1999, 2000; Higgins et al., 1985, 1986; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Strauman & Higgins, 1987, 
1988; for reviews see Boldero & Francis,1999, 2000; Higgins, 1987, 1999a, 1999b).For example, in an early 
test of SD theory, Higgins and colleagues (1986, Experiment 2) primed ought and ideal discrepancies in 
participants high or low in both types of discrepancies. People with large SDs were more agitated in the ought-
self priming condition and more dejected in the ideal-self priming condition. The results supported the theory’s 
predictions and demonstrated the role of discrepancy type, magnitude, and accessibility as moderators (cf. 
Boldero & Francis, 2000). 
 
As research has accumulated, some researchers have expressed reservations about the extent of support for SD 
theory’s predictions. First, the discriminant validity of ideal and ought discrepancies has been questioned 
(Ozgul, Heubeck, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2003; Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, &Barlow, 1998). Studies routinely 
find high correlations between ideal and ought discrepancies, typically over .50 and often as high as .80. In their 
multimethod study, Tangney and her colleagues (1998) found that ideal and ought discrepancies overlapped 
substantially; they concluded that there was ―very little unique variance in the quantitative estimates of these 
concepts‖ (p. 265). Gonnerman, Parker, Lavine, and Huff (2000) conducted a latent variable analysis of SDs 
and emotional experience. They did not estimate unique effects of ideal and ought discrepancies, however, 
because the discrepancy types were too highly correlated. Instead, ideal and ought discrepancies each indicated 
a latent SD variable. 
 
Second, the predicted relations between discrepancies and emotions were only partially supported in several 
studies. For example, ideal and ought discrepancies did not differentially predict depression and anxiety (Bruch, 
Rivet, & Laurenti, 2000), as specified by the tripartite model (Clark &Watson, 1991). Ideal discrepancies 
predicted depressive distress and anhedonia—two markers of depression—but ought discrepancies also 
predicted depressive distress and anhedonia. Neither type of SD predicted agitation. In a structural model of self 
aspects and emotional distress (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000), ideal discrepancies predicted both 
dejection and agitation, whereas ought discrepancies predicted neither emotion. Carver et al. (1999) found that 
the ideal self (controlling for ought and feared selves) predicted depression. The ought self (controlling for ideal 
and feared selves) only predicted agitation when people were far from their feared self. Similarly, Heppen and 
Ogilvie (2003) found that ideal- self discrepancies predicted dejection,but ought-self discrepancies predicted 
agitation only when people were far from their undesired self. 
 
Third, the unique relationships between ideal discrepancies and dejection and ought discrepancies and agitation 
have not appeared in at least two studies. Tangney et al. (1998) found that ideal and ought discrepancies 
predicted both agitation and dejection. Their findings appeared for a large sample, for several measures of 
discrepancies, and for validated emotion scales. Furthermore, their literal replication of the classic study by 
Higgins et al. (1985) failed to replicate its findings. When unique effects of ideal and ought discrepancies were 
estimated, small and largely nonsignificant correlations appeared—this suggests that the effects of discrepancies 
stem from their shared variance. Using two measures of self discrepancies, Ozgul et al. (2003) found few 
unique relationships between ideal discrepancies and dejection and ought discrepancies and agitation. Instead, 
each discrepancy predicted all negative emotions. 
 
INTERSECTING OSA THEORY AND SD THEORY 
The presence of supportive and unsupportive findings suggests that researchers should explore moderating 
variables. Higgins (1999b) and Boldero and Francis (2000) contended that research should not consider SDs in 
terms of invariant main effects. For example, Higgins suggested that a discrepancy’s accessibility, magnitude, 
contextual relevance, and importance moderate the relationship between discrepancies and affect. The next step 
in SD research is to identify variables that moderate SD theory’s predictions. Finding moderating variables, 
interactive processes, and boundary conditions enriches a theory and enhances a field’s understanding of the 
dynamics of psychological processes. 
 
The present experiment thus examines self-awareness as a moderator of SD theory’s predictions. As noted ear-
lier, OSA theory and SD theory make similar assumptions about the mechanisms of self-evaluation. OSA the-
ory traces self-evaluation to the state of self-focused attention; SD theory traces self-evaluation to the accessi-
bility of a discrepancy. This unappreciated continuity between the theories suggests that self-awareness may 
moderate SD effects. Focusing attention on the self greatly heightens the accessibility of self-relevant infor-
mation (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003; Hull, Van Treuren, Ashford, Propsom, &Andrus, 1988) and the accessibility 
of self-standard discrepancies (Carver, 1975; Gibbons, 1990; Ickes, Wicklund, &Ferris, 1973). High self-focus 
also increases the motivation to be congruent with standards, thereby amplifying the motivational and emotional 
consequences of self–standard discrepancies (Hormuth,1982; Silvia &Duval, 2004; Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). 
In short, self-awareness can increase the accessibility of a discrepancy as well as the significance of a 
discrepancy. 
 
After a manipulation of self-awareness, people completed ameasure of SDs (Higgins et al., 1997) and several 
measures of emotional experience. We predicted that self-awareness would moderate the relationship between 
SDs and negative affect. The alignment of SDs and negative affect should increase as self-awareness increases. 
If the pattern predicted by SD theory appears, then the correlation between ought discrepancies and agitation 
and between ideal discrepancies and dejection should be higher when people are self-aware. If the general 
pattern found by Ozgul et al. (2003) and Tangney et al. (1998) appears, then discrepancies should predict all 
negative emotions more strongly when self-awareness is high. 
 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
A total of 112 students—95 women, 17 men—from general psychology classes at the University of North 
Carolina–Greensboro (UNCG) participated and received credit toward a research option. All participants were 
native speakers of English. Each person was randomly assigned to one of two between-subject conditions: high 
self-awareness or low self-awareness. 
 
Procedure 
As participants arrived for the experiment, they were greeted by a female experimenter who sat them at small 
tables in private rooms. When the students sat at the table, they faced either the reflective side (high- self-
awareness condition) or the backside (low-selfawareness condition) of a large mirror (24"x 36″).One of the 
oldest self-awareness manipulations (Carver & Scheier, 1978; Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Wicklund & 
Duval,1971), the mirror procedure is widely used in contemporary research (Dijksterhuis &van Knippenberg, 
2000; Mullen, Migdal, & Rozell, 2003; Silvia, 2002a, 2002b). The experimenter casually apologized for the 
condition of the room, explaining that it was being used for several experiments and that the other experiment-
ers had asked that nothing be rearranged. Participants learned that the purpose of the experiment was to gather 
information about how UNCG students view themselves, and they were asked to complete two questionnaires. 
 
Selves Questionnaire. The first questionnaire was a paper-and-pencil version of the computerized Selves 
Questionnaire developed and used by Higgins et al. (1997). After reading definitions of actual, ideal, and ought 
selves, participants wrote five ideal and five ought attributes describing themselves. After listing each attribute, 
they rated (a) the extent to which they would like to ideally possess it or believed they should possess it, and (b) 
the extent to which they actually did possess it. Participants completed the questionnaire from their own 
perspective and from the perspective of someone close to them. Only the self’s perspective was analyzed, 
because SD theory and OSA theory overlap in this domain; OSA theory makes no predictions regarding 
discrepancies rooted in another person’s perspective. The self’s perspective always came first, as in past 
research (Higgins et al., 1997). 
 
Emotions. After the Selves Questionnaire, participants completed measures of emotional experience. One was a 
measure created by Higgins et al. (1997, Experiment 2). Using a 5-point scale, participants rated how frequently 
and intensely they had experienced 12 emotions in the past week. Six emotions reflected agitation (agitated, on 
edge, uneasy, tense, calm, and relaxed), and 6 reflected dejection (disappointed, discouraged, low, sad, happy, 
and satisfied). Researchers have criticized the use of brief, ad hoc emotion scales in self- discrepancy research 
(Tangney et al., 1998). We thus included the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, 
&Tellegen,1988), awidelyused and well-validated measure of emotions (Schmuckle, Egloff, &Burns, 
2002).This scale forms two factors: Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA). Low PA reflects depression 
and dejection, and high NA reflects anxiety and agitation (Clark &Watson, 1991; Watson, 2000; Watson et al., 
1995). 
 
RESULTS 
Data Reduction 
Several variables were calculated for final analyses. Actual-self ratings were subtracted from the ideal-self or 
ought-self rating for each item to create discrepancies. The five ideal discrepancies were averaged to form an 
ideal-discrepancy score, and the five ought discrepancies were averaged to form an ought-discrepancy score. 
Agitation and dejection scores were calculated by averaging the intensity and frequency ratings for the six items 
in each scale, after reverse scoring as needed. We also computed a negative affect score by averaging agitation 
and dejection. PA and NA scores were formed as in past research with the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). Table 
1 displays the estimates of internal consistency and the descriptive statistics for all measures.
1 
 
Relations of Ideal and Ought Discrepancies With Dejection and Agitation 
Did self-awareness affect the relationship between SDs and emotional experience? SD theory predicts that ideal 
discrepancies will predict dejection and ought discrepancies will predict agitation. OSA theory predicts that 
discrepancies will covary more strongly with emotions when self-awareness is high. Table 2 displays the effects 
of the self-awareness manipulation on the zero- order correlations between discrepancies and emotions; Figure 
1 illustrates the pattern of relationships. 
 
Within-condition effects. We first tested whether the relationships between discrepancies and emotions differed 
significantly from zero within the low- and high-selfawareness conditions. As predicted by OSA theory, the 
relationships between discrepancies and emotions were clearly stronger when self-awareness was high. In the 
low- self-awareness condition (shown above the diagonal in Table 2), ideal and ought discrepancies had nearly 
no significant correlations with emotional experience— only 1 of 10 correlations was significant. Neither ideal 
nor ought discrepancies predicted dejection, agitation, negative affect, or PA. The only significant effect was a 
correlation between ought discrepancies and NA. 
 
In the high-self-awareness condition (shown below the diagonal in Table 2), in contrast, both ideal and ought 
discrepancies significantly predicted a broad range of emotions—9 of 10 correlations were significant. Each 
discrepancy type significantly correlated with dejection, agitation, and negative affect. For the PANAS scales, 
ideal and ought discrepancies both predicted low PA, and ought discrepancies predicted NA. 
 
 
 
Between-condition effects. The within-condition effects indicated that the relations between discrepancies and 
emotions depended on self-awareness. In the low-selfawareness condition, only 1 of 10 correlations differed 
from zero; in the high self-awareness condition, 9 of 10 correlations differed from zero. We thus turned to test-
ing if the correlations differed between conditions. Confidence intervals around r, shown in Table 3, were com-
puted to test whether these relationships differed significantly between self-awareness conditions. Following 
our directional predictions (i.e., self-awareness will amplify the relationships),the confidence intervals indicate 
one-tailed tests of differences between independent correlations. 
 
For ideal discrepancies, four of the five correlations were significantly different. The high-self-awareness 
condition had significantly stronger relations for dejection, agitation, negative affect, and PA; the groups did not 
differ in the relation between ideal discrepancies and NA. For ought discrepancies, a similar but weaker pattern 
appeared. The high-self-awareness condition had significantly stronger relations for agitation and negative 
affect; the relations for dejection, PA, and NA did not differ. The between-condition analyses thus converged 
with the within-condition analyses—selfawareness promoted stronger relationships between discrepancies and 
emotions. 
 
Exploring Unique Effects of Ideal and Ought Discrepancies 
Given high self-awareness, both ideal and ought discrepancies predicted a wide range of emotions at the zero-
order level. For a closer look at relations between discrepancies and emotions, we explored whether ideal and 
ought discrepancies had unique relations to agitation and dejection. SD research commonly controls for the 
shared variance of ideal discrepancies and ought discrepancies. Yet, sometimes the shared variance is quite 
high, leaving little unique variance. As noted in the introduction, many studies find substantial overlap between 
ideal and ought discrepancies. For example, Gonnerman et al. (2000) found that ideal and ought discrepancies 
correlated too highly to allow estimation of unique effects, and Tangney et al. (1998) found that the 
 
 
Selves Questionnaire ―essentially taps one big self- discrepancy‖ (p. 266). 
 
We thus first assessed whether ideal and ought discrepancies formed distinct constructs in our sample. To assess 
the relation between the discrepancies, we analyzed latent ideal and ought variables using AMOS 4 (Arbuckle 
& Wothke, 1999; Byrne, 2001). The five observed ideal-discrepancy scores were indicators for a latent ideal 
discrepancy, and the five observed ought- discrepancy scores were indicators for a latent ought discrepancy. 
This analysis estimated the covariance between ideal and ought discrepancies, controlling for the unknown 
measurement error. The latent ideal and ought discrepancies were highly correlated, ß = .767,p < .001 (B = .401, 
SE = .112, critical ratio [CR] = 3.59). As one would expect, the latent correlation was higher than most of the 
observed correlations found in past studies. An exploratory factor analysis of the discrepancy scores further 
suggested substantial shared variance. A principal-axis factor analysis (Russell, 2002) of the 10 SD items (5 for 
ideal discrepancies, 5 for ought discrepancies) found a clear single factor (34% of the variance) according to 
eigenvalues and scree plots. Factor loadings ranged from .41 to .69. In sum, the latent variable analysis and the 
factor analysis indicated that the measurement, as in past studies, yielded ―one big self- discrepancy‖ (Tangney 
et al., 1998, p. 266). 
 
The outcomes of multiple regression analyses were consistent with a single underlying discrepancy factor. 
When self-awareness was low, ideal discrepancies did not predict dejection when considered alone or simulta-
neously with ought discrepancies (all ßs < .18, ns), and ought discrepancies did not predict agitation when con-
sidered alone or simultaneously with ideal discrepancies (all ßs < .09, ns).When self-awareness was high, ideal 
and ought discrepancies predicted emotions when entered alone but not when considered simultaneously. 
Although ideal discrepancies predicted dejection (ß = .32,p<.016),neither ideal (ß=.14,p<.39) nor ought dis-
crepancies (ß = .27,p < .11) predicted dejection when considered together. Likewise, although ought 
discrepancies predicted agitation (ß = .33,p < .013), neither ought (ß = .22,p < .19) nor ideal discrepancies (ß 
=.17,p < .32) predicted agitation when considered together. The regression analyses converge to show that ideal 
and ought discrepancies predicted emotions with what they share, not with what is unique. This is nota surprise, 
given (a) the high correlation between latent ideal and ought constructs and (b) the loading of discrepancy 
scores on a single factor. Ideal and ought discrepancies had little unique variance available for predicting other 
variables. 
 
Relation of Overall Discrepancy With Emotions 
Given the converging evidence for a single discrepancy factor, we aggregated ideal and ought discrepancies to 
form an overall discrepancy score. If ideal and ought discrepancies predicted emotions by virtue of their shared 
variance, then aggregating them should result in more reliable estimates of emotion–discrepancy relationships 
(Epstein,1990). If they predict emotions byvirtue of their unique variance, then aggregating them should 
weaken these relationships. As before, we assessed both within-condition and between-condition effects. Within 
the low-self-awareness condition, overall discrepancy scores did not predict any of the emotion scores; none of 
the five correlations was significant (see Table 2). Within the high-self-awareness condition, in contrast, four of 
the five correlations were significant. Overall discrepancy scores significantly predicted dejection, agitation, 
negative affect, and PA; they did not predict NA. 
 
Comparisons of the correlations between conditions converged with the within-condition effects (see Table 
3).For four of the five emotion scores—agitation, dejection, negative affect, and PA—the high-self-awareness 
group had significantly higher correlations relative to the low-self-awareness group. No difference was found 
for NA. It is noteworthy that the between-condition effects were more reliable for the overall discrepancy scores 
than for the ideal or ought discrepancy scores. This further suggests that the shared variance of ideal 
discrepancies and ought discrepancies underlies the prediction of emotions. 
 
Considering Discrepancy Assessment 
This experiment found a high latent correlation between ideal and ought discrepancies (ß = .767,p < .001), and 
the relations of SDs to emotions suggested that ideal and ought discrepancies predicted emotions by virtue of 
their shared variance. One might wonder if these findings are due to idiosyncrasies of measurement. The 
version of the Selves Questionnaire used in our experiment has not been widely used (see Higgins et al., 1997), 
and the use of 5 items (instead of 10) may have artificially inflated the correlation between ideal and ought 
discrepancies. Thus, it is worth considering whether the present findings generalize to other  samples and to 
other measures of SDs. 
 
We can test if the high ideal–ought overlap is a measure-specific effect by examining the relationships between 
other measures of SDs. A sample of 224 undergraduate students at UNCG completed three measures of ideal 
and ought discrepancies. The first measure was a version of the Selves Questionnaire developed by Carver et al. 
(1999). For this scale, people write adjectives describing the ideal self and the ought self and then rate how 
discrepant the actual self is from the ideal or ought self, using 7-point scales. Carver et al. (1999) point out that 
unlike the traditional Selves Questionnaire, this version does not require computing difference scores. The 
second measure was a visual-analog scale of global discrepancy judgments developed by Heppen and Ogilvie 
(2003). Participants are shown a large circle that represents the ideal self, and they are asked to mark a box that 
represents how close or far they are from it. This is repeated for the ought self. This measure provides holistic 
ratings of ideal and ought discrepancies. The third measure was an adjective-rating scale used by Ozgul et al. 
(2003; see also Tangney et al., 1998). Participants rated the actual, ideal, and ought selves on a list of 60 adjec-
tives, using 7-point scales. Discrepancy scores were computed as the averaged differences between ideal and 
ought selves and the actual self. 
 
With three measures, one can estimate the latent correlation between ideal and ought discrepancies. By cor-
relating the residual errors according to method (e.g., correlating the residual of ideal-adjective ratings with the 
residual of ought-adjective ratings), a precise error-corrected estimate of the relation between discrepancies can 
be assessed (see Byrne, 2001; Kline, 1998). Using AMOS 4 (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999), we formed latent 
ideal and ought discrepancies. The three discrepancy measures defined the indicators for the latent variables, 
and the residual scores were correlated by method. The latent ideal and ought discrepancies were highly corre-
lated, ß = .775,p < .001 (B =1.24, SE= .228, CR = 5.44). In fact, the standardized estimate in this sample (ß = 
.775) was essentially identical to the experimental sample (ß = .767). 
 
Thus, we found a strong replication of the relationship between ideal and ought discrepancies—the effect 
appeared in two independent samples and with four measures of SDs. The high latent correlation between ideal 
and ought discrepancies replicated in a separate sample that completed three different measures of SDs. This 
suggests that the findings obtained in our experiment are not due to idiosyncrasies associated with the Selves 
Questionnaire. Instead, ideal and ought discrepancies appear to share substantial variance, perhaps to the point 
of measuring ―one big self-discrepancy‖ (Tangney et al., 1998, p. 266). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Many self theories consider how discrepancies between the self and standards for the self affect motivation and 
emotion, yet these self theories have rarely been intersected (see Tesser, 2000). The present research explored 
the overlap between two self theories: OSA theory (Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund,1972) and SD 
theory (Higgins,1987; Higgins et al.,1985). In particular, we tested whether self-awareness moderates SD the-
ory’s predictions of how ideal and ought discrepancies affect dejection and agitation. SD theory assumes that 
accessible discrepancies predict emotions more strongly (Higgins, 1987). Self-awareness enhances the 
accessibility of disparities between self and standards (Hormuth, 1982; Ickes et al., 1973; Sedikides, 1992) and 
makes discrepancies more self-relevant (Duval & Silvia, 2001, 2002). As a result, it seemed promising as a 
moderator of SD theory’s predictions. 
 
Past research suggested two possible patterns. First, ideal and ought discrepancies could uniquely predict 
dejection and agitation, as expected from SD theory and found in past research (e.g., Boldero &Francis, 2000; 
Higgins et al., 1985, 1986, 1997; Strauman & Higgins, 1987, 1988). Alternatively, both types of discrepancies 
could generally predict negative emotions, as found in recent studies (Gramzow et al., 2000; Ozgul et al., 2003; 
Tangney et al., 1998). In the present experiment, self- awareness clearly strengthened the alignment of dis-
crepancies and emotions. The alignment, however, was general. In the low-self-awareness condition, ideal and 
ought discrepancies were essentially unrelated to emotions. In the high-self-awareness condition, in contrast, 
both ideal and ought discrepancies broadly predicted emotions. 
 
Like other studies (Gonnerman et al., 2000; Tangney et al., 1998), our experiment found substantial overlap 
between ideal and ought discrepancies. The latent correlation of ideal and ought discrepancies was .77 in two 
samples. Congruentwith the strong shared variance, neither ideal nor ought discrepancies uniquely predicted 
dejection or agitation in multiple regression analyses. Furthermore, aggregating ideal and ought discrepancies 
into an overall discrepancy index promoted stronger relationships with emotions. These analyses converge on a 
clear conclusion—the relations between discrepancies and emotions in our sample were driven by the 
substantial variance shared by ideal and ought discrepancies. 
 
We should note that this study was designed to examine the intersection of two self theories, not to assess 
definitively the validity of OSA theory or SD theory. The present experiment found that OSA theory and SD 
theory have interesting and coherent relationships, and the results suggest productive directions for future 
research on the continuities between theories in the ―self-zoo‖ (Tesser, 2000). Although this experiment has 
implications for the validity of SD theory, it remains for future research to conduct more comprehensive 
evaluations of the theory. Thus far, few studies of SD theory’s predictions have had sample sizes of more than 
100, more than one measure of SDs, or multiple measures of emotions. Moreover, SD theory’s predictions lend 
themselves to latent variable analysis, yet this has not been undertaken. 
 
Implications for Theories of SDs 
The findings of this experiment have several implications for theories of the role of SDs in emotional experi-
ence. The most salient implications are for SD theory. Unique relations between types of discrepancies and 
types of emotions did not appear in this experiment. Instead, the findings replicated experiments that found 
general effects of discrepancies on negative emotions. As Higgins (1999b) noted, research on SD theory should 
explore ―second generation‖ questions concerning moderators and boundaries of the theory’s effects. In the 
spirit of this suggestion, this experiment found that self-awareness moderated the link between discrepancies 
and emotions, although it did not promote unique links between them. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the domain of SD theory, as with most theories in psychology, is becoming 
more focused as research accumulates. Experiments that support the theory generally have done so in specific 
circumstances, such as when people have large SDs that are highly accessible (e.g., Higgins et al., 1986, 1997) 
or when specific aspects of ideal and ought discrepancies are relevant to the momentary context (Boldero & 
Francis, 2000). Methodological factors— such as measuring emotions with ad hoc clusters of items (Higgins et 
al., 1985, 1986; Strauman & Higgins, 1988) versus validated multi-item scales (Bruch et al., 2000; Ozgul et al., 
2003; Tangney et al.,1998)—may also play a role. Based on the growing body of work on SD theory, it seems 
that SD theory’s predictions are more circumscribed than expected from the original theory. More research on 
possible moderators of the links between ideal discrepancies, ought discrepancies, and different negative 
emotions is needed to clarify the boundaries of SD theory’s predictions. 
 
The present findings also have implications for OSA theory. OSA theory assumes that self-focused attention 
leads to self-evaluation, and that gaps between the self and standards create negative affect (Silvia &Duval, 
2004). OSA theory’s prediction that self-awareness increases the relationship between SDs and negative 
emotions was clearly supported. This adds to the building body of work on the consequences of self-awareness 
for negative emotions (Mor & Winquist, 2002; Nezlek, 2002) and illustrates the fundamental connection 
between self-awareness and self-evaluation (see Silvia & Phillips, 2004; Wicklund, 1975). Finding a general 
connection between discrepancies and emotions is congruent with OSA theory, which has remained agnostic 
about types of standards and types of negative emotions. Nevertheless, it may benefit OSA theory to move 
toward greater specificity in its predictions, given that much has been learned about emotions since the original 
theory was developed (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). For example, the broad PA factor (Watson, 2000) was the 
strongest correlate of discrepancies in the present study. In general, discrepancies predicted low PA and high 
dejection (a marker of low PA) most reliably. NA varied inconsistently with self-discrepancies, and it was the 
only emotion score that self-awareness did not affect. Although preliminary, this provides hints about the 
emotions that may be most strongly implicated in discrepancies between the self and standards. 
 
Although not the focus of the present research, another important theory of SDs and emotions deserves mention. 
According to Ogilvie’s (1987; Ogilvie &Clark, 1992) undesired-self theory, representations of selves that the 
person wants to avoid dominate self-regulation. The theory is not committed to unique discrepancies associated 
with unique negative emotions. Instead, the theory assumes that the undesired self is a stronger guide for self-
regulation than has been recognized thus far. Research to date suggests that the undesired self plays a strong 
role in emotional life (Carver et al., 1999; 
Heppen & Ogilvie, 2003). Research on the undesired self reflects the lack of integration of the many self theo-
ries (Tesser, 2000). Thus far, the overlap between the undesired-self theory and OSA theory remains unex-
plored. This research found that self-awareness amplified the relation between discrepancies and emotions. This 
may also hold true for discrepancies from the undesired self, which resemble the ―standards of correctness‖ 
emphasized by the original OSA theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). It would be worthwhile for future research 
to intersect the two theories. 
 
NOTE 
1. The discrepancy and affect variables were examined for nonnormality, and scatterplots were examined for 
outliers. Some of the variables deviated from normality. Transforming the distributions did not appreciably 
affect their relationships, so subsequent analyses used the untransformed values. 
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